Discussion Some thoughts on suicide and epistemology.

[democritusjunior]

Many famous suicides (e.g., Cleopatra, Adolf Hitler, the 9/11 jumpers, etc.) killed themselves in the stead of a worse outcome. Emile Durkheim describes this as fatalistic suicide, though I'd actually describe fatalistic suicide as, characteristically, more akin to murder (given the suicide is typically a consequence of another individual's prospective intentions, rather than an insular contempt for life).

Intuitively, fatalistic suicide is ostensibly the most rational expression of the practice of suicide. Yet, it's quite possible this genre of suicide can only be performed rationally in situations of epistemic certainty; as in, with a complete or almost complete knowledge of the future. Is it the case, even if the chances of a worse outcome not occurring are as low as a single percent, that fatalistic suicide is actually irrational? Imagine an expected value game wherein one risks a particular amount of incredibly likely suffering for the very slim chance of, let's say, half a lifetime's worth of pleasure; now, imagine if the likelihood of that suffering is contingent upon such a complex variety of factors that it is unquantifiable by any normal means, but that you yourself (and probably only you) estimate it to be very high. Seems irrational to not take the slim chance (especially in the latter scenario), no? That isn't even factoring in the chances that a particular suicide may fail, and, if it does, the ramifications that failure may have on your prospective suffering.

In respect to the actual most rational manifestation of suicide, I'd argue that seppuku/harakiri are more rational, because they are motivated by a singular desire to kill oneself insofar as it is killing oneself; and there is certainly no such thing as an irrational end, only an irrational mean.

 

[Canto XIII]

Can you elaborate on the fact there's supposedely no irrational end?

 

[democritusjunior]

Can you elaborate on the fact there's supposedely no irrational end?

For example, I don't think it's necessarily irrational to desire losing all of your money gambling in Las Vegas. It would be irrational, however, to then go to Las Vegas and purposefully win every game of Poker you play, given that would be a betrayal your intention. People desire bizarre things and desire itself is bizarre/insular.

 

[_Gollum_]

Seems irrational to not take the slim chance (especially in the latter scenario), no?

This seems to assume that pleasure is better than nonexistence, which I don't think is true. Nonexistence > pleasure > suffering

 

[Bitter Almonds]

Many famous suicides (e.g., Cleopatra, Adolf Hitler, the 9/11 jumpers, etc.) killed themselves in the stead of a worse outcome. Emile Durkheim describes this as fatalistic suicide, though I'd actually describe fatalistic suicide as, characteristically, more akin to murder (given the suicide is typically a consequence of another individual's prospective intentions, rather than an insular contempt for life).

Intuitively, fatalistic suicide is ostensibly the most rational expression of the practice of suicide. Yet, it's quite possible this genre of suicide can only be performed rationally in situations of epistemic certainty; as in, with a complete or almost complete knowledge of the future. Is it the case, even if the chances of a worse outcome not occurring are as low as a single percent, that fatalistic suicide is actually irrational? Imagine an expected value game wherein one risks a particular amount of incredibly likely suffering for the very slim chance of, let's say, half a lifetime's worth of pleasure; now, imagine if the likelihood of that suffering is contingent upon such a complex variety of factors that it is unquantifiable by any normal means, but that you yourself (and probably only you) estimate it to be very high. Seems irrational to not take the slim chance (especially in the latter scenario), no? That isn't even factoring in the chances that a particular suicide may fail, and, if it does, the ramifications that failure may have on your prospective suffering.

In respect to the actual most rational manifestation of suicide, I'd argue that seppuku/harakiri are more rational, because they are motivated by a singular desire to kill oneself insofar as it is killing oneself; and there is certainly no such thing as an irrational end, only an irrational mean.

I don't think it's irrational. In fact, I'd say that this is my brand of suicidal. Even if the odds of a terrible outcome were insanely low, the odds don't go away.

So you then have those odds eating away at you every day, for the rest of your life. How can you experience true pleasure if the risk of a terrible fate is always hanging over you?

Anxiety, rumination, etc., can eat you alive. And then, after all that, the terrible fate still can happen to you. So why agonize when you can just ctb and avoid the whole thing?

 

[GodChallengesMe]

This seems to assume that pleasure is better than nonexistence, which I don't think is true. Nonexistence > pleasure > suffering

Nonexistence can't be better than anything because there's nothing to compare with. Nonexistence is simply no attribute that can be defined whereas good and bad i.e. pleasure and suffering are attributes that can be defined and explained. When you're no more, you can't compare the experience of not being (which in itself is not an experience at all) with experiences of pleasure and suffering.

So, if someone doesn't believe in afterlife of any sort (i.e. continuation of stream of consciousness or POV), then suicide is irrational because you give up everything there is to never ever experience anything again. But, irrational is defined mathematically or statistically, not subjectively so in the end it makes not much sense when taking decisions as human beings. Because we're not machines that calculate chances and outcomes but rather rely on our intuition more, it makes no sense to sit down and use sophisticated statistics software to input every possible variable one can identify to then calculate what are the ratios of pleasure and suffering one can get in the life and only then make the logical choice according to the results one gets on the display of their computer. Humans don't work like that, we're emotional creatures after all.

So, suicide is by itself irrational no matter what one believes happens after death and no matter how one sees their circumstances in this life i.e. how they subjectively evaluate the ratios of pleasurable things to suffering life throws at them. Statistically there might be 99% pleasure and only 1% suffering and the particular person might still CTB due to that 1% suffering because we're not machines.

 

[Forever Sleep]

I think it's because the very likely worse case scenario in these situations could well be horrific. The people who jumped on 9/11 were facing the likelihood of being burned to death or suffocating in the fumes. Hitler was presumably quite nervous of who may find him and what they may do to him. Would it necessarily be a clean death? So- it seems more likely (to me) that they were trying to escape likely horrific pain and fear. Surely- that's always a logical choice?

Against what too? What life experience could compensate for the opportunity to escape (very likely and imminent) excruciating pain?

Let's say they didn't jump and, by some miracle- they survived 9/11 but- they did so with horrific injuries. They are paralysed from the neck down. They express to the medical staff and their families that they wish to die but- they aren't allowed to. How pleased will they be with their decision then?

I think we make decisions on instinct in the moment to some extent. But then- even if we go about things logically- is it always a logical choice to choose life? Imagine living with the trauma of that day even.

I've thought about that regarding the Titanic sinking. Would it in fact have been good to survive that? Having witnessed the horror of that event? Having witnessed other people die? Even members of your own family. Some of them will have survived while their partners died. What would life then be like living with trauma, survivor's guilt, possibly long term injuries? Why is living necessarily the logical choice?

 

[democritusjunior]

Nonexistence can't be better than anything because there's nothing to compare with. Nonexistence is simply no attribute that can be defined whereas good and bad i.e. pleasure and suffering are attributes that can be defined and explained. When you're no more, you can't compare the experience of not being (which in itself is not an experience at all) with experiences of pleasure and suffering.

So, if someone doesn't believe in afterlife of any sort (i.e. continuation of stream of consciousness or POV), then suicide is irrational because you give up everything there is to never ever experience anything again. But, irrational is defined mathematically or statistically, not subjectively so in the end it makes not much sense when taking decisions as human beings. Because we're not machines that calculate chances and outcomes but rather rely on our intuition more, it makes no sense to sit down and use sophisticated statistics software to input every possible variable one can identify to then calculate what are the ratios of pleasure and suffering one can get in the life and only then make the logical choice according to the results one gets on the display of their computer. Humans don't work like that, we're emotional creatures after all.

So, suicide is by itself irrational no matter what one believes happens after death and no matter how one sees their circumstances in this life i.e. how they subjectively evaluate the ratios of pleasurable things to suffering life throws at them. Statistically there might be 99% pleasure and only 1% suffering and the particular person might still CTB due to that 1% suffering because we're not machines.

This is fallacious.

Is it better that there be suffering or no suffering? It would seem the non-existence of suffering is better than the existence of suffering.

 

[Canto XIII]

For example, I don't think it's necessarily irrational to desire losing all of your money gambling in Las Vegas. It would be irrational, however, to then go to Las Vegas and purposefully win every game of Poker you play, given that would be a betrayal your intention. People desire bizarre things and desire itself is bizarre/insular.

Correct me if I'm wrong (I'm very dumb and ignorant), but that just means that desires aren't irrational by themselves, not that they can't be irrational in relation to other desires or aspects of life. Desiring to lose all your money is perfectly irrational in relation to the necessity and desire to continue to own money in order to survive (that is, assuming you're not suicidal, but the people on this forum are the exception). You say that yourself when you state that, in the right circumstances, the "fatalistic suicide" of Cleopatra VII and Hitler (and let's add also the likes of Seneca, who was ordered to kill himself by a man who was basically the owner of the world) is "rational". It is rational, you mean, not by itself, but in relation to the circumstances surrounding it and the desires originating from those circumstances: they desire death because they desire to avoid the additional pain that staying alive would entail. In other words it seems to me that when you say there is no irrational end you're defining rationality according to the Hegelian principle that "what is rational is real, what is real is rational" (which I somewhat agree with, in the right context), but you don't follow the same definition in the first part of your discourse. That is, you use first a subjective concept of rationality ("it is rational what is born out of human reason"), then an objective one ("it is rational what can be understood by human reason").

If we assume the latter definition, it's arguable that all desires and all forms of suicide, no matter the underlying motives, are perfectly and equally rational, as they are things which exist within reality.

If we assume the former, seppuku (which is basically the same as Ajax's suicide) is not particularly rational, as it's not based in the profound structure of life, but in a concept of honour or glory which is completely conventional and arbitrary (rather than being death for the sake of death, which would itself be an irrational desire), as it's also Socrates' strict abiding to Athenian law. At least, seppuku is no more rational than taking one's own life because of a misguided assertion of probability like the fallacious fatalistic suicides do. You could also go further and argue than any desire is ultimately irrational, if you abide by Schopenhauer's blind will. In this sense, killing oneself is in its turn always irrational. Schopenhauer describes it as a misguided act originating from the desire of a better life, not of death (for how can you possibly desire something which is nothing, like death is?), which is basically the same thing Cioran says defining it as an optimist's act. Leopardi, who holds a somewhat different position, concludes that suicide is nonsensical and therefore to be avoided in order not to bring pain to others.

Do you feel your desire for death is akin to the desire of the samurai who committed seppuku?

 

[democritusjunior]

If we assume the former, seppuku (which is basically the same as Ajax's suicide) is not particularly rational, as it's not based in the profound structure of life, but in a concept of honour or glory which is completely conventional and arbitrary (rather than being death for the sake of death, which would itself be an irrational desire), as it's also Socrates' strict abiding to Athenian law. At least, seppuku is no more rational than taking one's own life because of a misguided assertion of probability like the fallacious fatalistic suicides do. You could also go further and argue than any desire is ultimately irrational, if you abide by Schopenhauer's blind will. In this sense, killing oneself is in its turn always irrational. Schopenhauer describes it as a misguided act originating from the desire of a better life, not of death (for how can you possibly desire something which is nothing, like death is?), which is basically the same thing Cioran says defining it as an optimist's act. Leopardi, who holds a somewhat different position, concludes that suicide is nonsensical and therefore to be avoided in order not to bring pain to others.

Do you feel your desire for death is akin to the desire of the samurai who committed seppuku?

You're not ignorant and my desire for death is, unlike a samurai's, irrational.

If you abide by Schopenhauer's blind will. In this sense, killing oneself is in its turn always irrational. Schopenhauer describes it as a misguided act originating from the desire of a better life, not of death (for how can you possibly desire something which is nothing, like death is?), which is basically the same thing Cioran says defining it as an optimist's act. Leopardi, who holds a somewhat different position, concludes that suicide is nonsensical and therefore to be avoided in order not to bring pain to others.

Monism, in my opinion, is a nonstarter. Bertrand Russell successfully convinced me of such, although I'm not too interested in debating the metaphysics of that. Schopenhauer's argument from a "desire for a better life" seems too anecdotal to me. Is it truly the case that every instance of suicide is galvanized by that particular desire? Seems unlikely. Cioran has his insights, but most of his work is an exercise in sarcasm and melodrama—impressionism. I think he gets a kick out of lambasting suicide simply because it seems so out of character, and, as a great aphorist, he finds a way to make it work.

 

[Canto XIII]

Monism, in my opinion, is a nonstarter. Bertrand Russell successfully convinced me of such, although I'm not too interested in debating the metaphysics of that.

I don't think non-monism automatically invalidates the concepts associated with Schopenhauer's blind will. Personally I used it here mostly as a metaphor (which is probably a sign of incoherence, but whatever). I agree this is not central to the theme at hand though.

Schopenhauer's argument from a "desire for a better life" seems too anecdotal to me. Is it truly the case that every instance of suicide is galvanized by that particular desire? Seems unlikely. Cioran has his insights, but most of his work is an exercise in sarcasm and melodrama—impressionism. I think he gets a kick out of lambasting suicide simply because it seems so out of character, and, as a great aphorist, he finds a way to make it work.

I agree. Actually my memory, or my superficial culture, could be failing me here, but if that's not the case, I think he may be thinking of some sort of a "most "ypical" form of suicide, that of the desperate who desires something but can't see any way to get it; which is probably the most relevant case in his discourse concercing the way to excape from existential pain. Of course that was not the case of Socrates for example. Also I agree about Cioran lol, he's somewhat of a windbag, but he fitted too well here not to quote him.

my desire for death is, unlike a samurai's, irrational.

Setting aside the samurai, I think everything, despite possibly looking irrational at first, is ultimately rational in the Hegelian sense, and everyone have some kind of reason (except apparently some quantum physics' phenomenons, but I'm shamefully and regretfully ignorant in physics; anyway, I don't think it really matters here). Well, I don't want to pry, I just got curious.

 

[dust-in-the-wind]

I don't think it's irrational. In fact, I'd say that this is my brand of suicidal. Even if the odds of a terrible outcome were insanely low, the odds don't go away.

So you then have those odds eating away at you every day, for the rest of your life. How can you experience true pleasure if the risk of a terrible fate is always hanging over you?

Anxiety, rumination, etc., can eat you alive. And then, after all that, the terrible fate still can happen to you. So why agonize when you can just ctb and avoid the whole thing?

This is exactly the same way I think too.

 

[Canto XIII]

I don't think it's irrational. In fact, I'd say that this is my brand of suicidal. Even if the odds of a terrible outcome were insanely low, the odds don't go away.

So you then have those odds eating away at you every day, for the rest of your life. How can you experience true pleasure if the risk of a terrible fate is always hanging over you?

Anxiety, rumination, etc., can eat you alive. And then, after all that, the terrible fate still can happen to you. So why agonize when you can just ctb and avoid the whole thing?

But those feelings of an impending doom are exactly part of that suffering you can expect but whose odds you can't really calculate. You can't know whether anxiety and rumination will last forever, you can't know how much they will last. Therefore killing yourself on their basis is irrational. That's what I think Democritus meant.

 

[Bitter Almonds]

But those feelings of an impending doom are exactly part of that suffering you can expect but whose odds you can't really calculate. You can't know whether anxiety and rumination will last forever, you can't know how much they will last. Therefore killing yourself on their basis is irrational. That's what I think Democritus meant.

You misunderstand. It isn't just a feeling of impending doom. There is a sword of damocles. It may drop, it may not, but the fact that it may drop at all is the source of anxiety/ ruminating.

So, since nothing can make the sword go away, the anxiety and ruminating will not go away. thus, catching the bus is the answer.

It's it possible to one day be able to feel okay with the sword falling? perhaps. but then if the sword does fall, you have to deal with the fallout of that, which is permanent.

So the only answer that makes sense is to ctb.

 

[Canto XIII]

It's it possible to one day be able to feel okay with the sword falling? perhaps. but then if the sword does fall, you have to deal with the fallout of that, which is permanent.

What would be the fallout you're talking about? Death itself? A painful death? Or some painful living situation?

 

[Bitter Almonds]

What would be the fallout you're talking about? Death itself? A painful death? Or some painful living situation?

Extremely painful living situation. Death would be not a big deal at this point. after all, death is coming regardless. that sword is over all of our heads.

 

[Canto XIII]

Extremely painful living situation. Death would be not a big deal at this point. after all, death is coming regardless. that sword is over all of our heads.

But even then, wouldn't it be better to wait until that terrible thing happens, and then in case kill yourself after?

 

[Bitter Almonds]

But even then, wouldn't it be better to wait until that terrible thing happens, and then in case kill yourself after?

But then you live under the paradigm of perpetual misery. If you can't cope with the feeling of the "maybe."

 

[Canto XIII]

If you can't cope with the feeling of the "maybe."

I agree that's difficult, at least in some circumstances. But circumstances (even internal ones) are everchanging. I don't want to preach too much, however.

 

[Gustav Hartmann]

Would a robot or a AI act completly rarional? I would say no. Algorithms and logic are only means to an end. The inital programming (for example: don't act against humans) is essential. The initial programmings are rational at a higher level and you can extend this up to the big bang, what is irrational in itself. We are nothing but bio-robots and we have no free will. So we don't commit suicide it happens to us.