I read a scientifical article on leftwing conservatism today. It was published by the German ministry of truth. The Bundeszentral für Politische Buldung. I think Americans would consider this institution Orwellian. But I think they make a pretty decent job.
I used a translator. I will add my thoughts at the end. If you are interested in reading the whole article here is the link. https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschrift...inkskonservatismus-als-inkorporationsgefuege/
It is on German. You will need a translator. Most of the texts published by the Bundeszentral für politische BIldung are for free.
Left-Wing Conservatism as an Incorporative Framework
Conservative thinking can harmonize with left-wing positions, though less in the form of a synthesis than in that of an incorporation. By harnessing conservative values, structures, and goals, left-wing projects can be realized with less friction.
That there has been a renewed interest in conservatism over the past few years has hardly escaped any observer: biographical works adorn shop windows just as much as those longing for a conservative renaissance or warning of a conservative radicalization. Inevitably, the term is frequently misused—a fate it shares with many high-profile "isms."
However, conservatism is particularly ill-equipped to defend itself against such abuse, as there is no standard for what should count as conservative and what should not. There is no conservative manifesto, no canon, not even a fixed worldview in the sense of shared political positions. While textbooks and academic literature frequently cite the Irish-British philosopher Edmund Burke as the father of conservative thought, Burke was not an original forge of ideology, unlike many liberals or socialists; his Reflections on the Revolution in France were not intended as a program of eternal validity. Rather, they constitute a philosophically saturated attack on the main figures of the French Revolution, whose project Burke saw heading toward an abyss. For all its striving for progress, he argued it had lost sight of the nature of man—his psychological constitution—and had degenerated into a carnival of political frivolity. What, indeed, was gained from all those "extravagant and presumptuous speculations which have taught your leaders to despise all their predecessors, and all their contemporaries, and even to despise themselves, until the moment in which they became truly despicable"? [1]
Burke owes his current status as a conservative forefather primarily to the fact that, although he had defended the "Glorious Revolution" against English absolutism and held considerable sympathy for the young American nation's struggle for independence, this specific critique of revolution was later interpreted as a general anti-revolutionary stance. [2] A conservative "innovation value" only emerges because the coarsening of this position opens a line of thought in political theory that focuses on stability rather than change; it no longer asks about the conditions for revolution and regicide, but rather about those for the preservation of the status quo, which has now been elevated to the desired state.
Defense of the Present
This "traditionalism becoming reflexive," as sociologist Karl Mannheim termed it, [3] remains reactive in its essence and should therefore be interpreted as a phenomenon of weakness. That which is safe does not need to be awakened from its political slumber. At the same time, this already reveals the limits of conservatism: unlike utopian thinking, it is bound to the present, and as this present gradually fades, it must take a form that remains intelligible from the perspective of the succeeding present. Consequently, the contemporary conservative can only grapple to a limited extent with the revolutions of the past as a defender of the present and the near-present; the contemporary revolutionary, however, can draw seamlessly from their heritage, demanding its completion, fulfillment, and often its exaggeration. [4]
This imbalance becomes even more conspicuous when reading other thinkers designated as classics of conservatism, such as Joseph de Maistre. One inevitably pauses when he mocks the lofty concept of popular sovereignty, stating it is astonishing how many sovereigns are destined to die without ever having reigned, [5] or claims that "nation" is an "extremely convenient" term because "one can make of it what one wishes." [6] Hardly any conservative of our day would object to these foundations of the modern constitutional state, whereas for de Maistre, they were still contaminated by the "un-spirit" of revolution. Nor would most contemporaries likely share the judgment that the feudal order, once it reached maturity, proved to be the "most perfect" thing "ever seen on earth." [7] To be sure, one finds all sorts of timeless insights in the Savoyard's writings, and his polemics against the pathos-drunk Jacobins appear almost modern in light of neo-Jacobin tendencies. But in the end, he sets himself up as a partisan of a world whose reality lies far outside our contemporary sensibility. The Marxist—one notes with some regret—can still claim a degree of supra-temporality because he believes he recognizes an explorable natural law in historical materialism; the conservative, by contrast, sees himself washed over by the tides of history without a true long-term goal, constantly forced to fight new (and different) battles of preservation. [8] Some have taken this Sisyphus-like struggle against the current of time as an occasion to fundamentally question the existence of conservative philosophy. They argue such a philosophy is a mere ex post construction and has little in common with the thought of Burke, who did not advocate for any specific form of property or religion, but solely for the protection of these values from their total dissolution. [9] After all, one is not a historic preservationist simply because one doesn't want to blow up the entire neighborhood.
Preserving the Proven
From these preliminary considerations, it becomes clear that all things conservative are based on an immediate contextual link. There is no singular principle like liberty or justice that reigns above all others, [10] whose contours remain largely stable and which therefore serves as a supra-temporal landmark. Instead, conservatism can perhaps best be described as an attitude that ascribes intrinsic value to the "proven" and understands preservation as a normative process. For by preserving what has proven itself, so the conservative promise goes, one helps society achieve a stable foundation and the individual gain "orientation rails" for their own life: supports whose true meaning often only becomes apparent at the moment of their loss. [11] In this sense, conservatism stands opposed to both regressive [12] and progressive movements aimed at changing the existing order, yet it remains more a mindset than a fully developed ideology. [13] And where it is ideology, it is one of practice, finding expression in the successful management of everyday life rather than in the construction of intricate theoretical frameworks. This also explains why, for the former Maoist and later Minister-President Winfried Kretschmann, "Sustainability is the new conservative," [14] while others place their vanishing point in a past that many contemporaries already regarded as a period of moral decay. [15]
I will skip the following parts. Mostly because of paranoid copyright fears. And there are many references to German politics.
Left and Conservative?
As for the "Left-Wing Conservatism" of the title, it is not a new invention of our time (in which the tying together of real or apparent opposites is considered bon ton), but a compound with some history. Already in his 1956 review of William Angus Sinclair's Socialism and the Individual, philosopher Herbert W. Schneider summarily declared the author and politician a "left-wing conservative," [19] because Sinclair believed the Conservative Party would soon prove to be the most socially progressive force. This was an error from which the disappointed Sinclair concluded he should defect to the Labour Party. Socialism and the Individual is as much political-theoretical exegesis as it is a personal letter of resignation.
In short, a certain vagueness has always been inherent to the term. Sometimes it appears as an external description, sometimes as a self-description; sometimes as a crude amalgam, and then again as a self-confident hybrid. In any case, however, it seeks to place "preservation" as a conservative essence within a left-wing frame of reference, which generally implies a greater degree of social equalization. This is an endeavor that, prima facie, seems by no means absurd: why, after all, should there not be people who maintain a conservative worldview—such as the loose connection of national pride, traditional role expectations, and a majoritarian lifestyle—and who are simultaneously declared supporters of the welfare state and a more forceful practice of redistribution? Firstly, in the realm of human sentiment, there is nothing that does not exist; and secondly, this constellation does not give rise to the contradictions that some believe they see in it. Indeed, one could even formulate the thesis that the local welfare state—by its origins a project of containment by the conservative Bismarck—is not only an effective instrument for cushioning social tensions [23] but has long since entered the traditional stock of the Federal Republic. Similarly, one might suspect that from a conservative perspective, little speaks against redistribution as long as it is based on the right considerations—namely, those that stabilize the social order. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, conservatives of the type described are rarely libertarians. Hardly any of them would have much sympathy for a "rump state," deregulated to the bone, where only the law of the larger coin decides.
In fact, the fit is so good that one might think (depending on what one projects onto the figure of the conservative) that there is a significant number of left-conservative voters: voters who, in the parlance of the GAL-TAN model, [24] are economically on the left but socially firmly on the TAN side (Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist), thus populating the lower-left quadrant of the corresponding matrix. However, researching this group is difficult if only because a small selection of socio-political variables cannot be representative of the overall arrangement of conservatism. Those who distinguish between conservative and progressive not based on the diversity of principles, but on whether one speaks for or against same-sex marriage and more democracy, [25] run the risk of being overtaken by reality [26]—and simultaneously ignore the fact that a conservative approach is also possible in fields like foreign policy. The question, for instance, of whether one remains loyal to the transatlantic alliance, loses oneself in the fantasy worlds of an emerging multipolarity, or even wants to take up the anti-imperialist struggle alongside the "wretched of the earth," is likely no less significant for many self-declared conservatives than the question of the correct degree of sexual-political permissivity.
Strategic Incorporation
Against this background, the left-conservative voter appears more as a byproduct of an immature operationalization practice than as a fixed statistical constant. However, if one focuses on the conservative concern for preservation instead of individual traditional or authoritarian positions, "left-conservative" can also describe a way of conducting politics in which the "Left" deliberately incorporates the "Conservative" into its own logic—or vice versa. The utility of such incorporations arises from the matter itself: just as most conservatives are interested in the pacification of social conflict, [27] most leftists first want to make the welfare state institutionally "weatherproof" before attempting projects of the "World Revolution" variety. Thus, some will draw from the left-wing toolbox and others from the conservative one without much hesitation. All that remains significant is which principle co-opts the other—which is, in the words of Gerhard Schröder's coalition dictum, [28] the conceptual "cook" and which is the instrumental "waiter." In both cases, however, one would do well not to lightly transfigure incorporation into fusion, but to understand it as a strategic moment: born from the insight that "Left" and "Conservative" may exhibit habitual differences but do not necessarily relate to each other like oil and water. Depending on the issue, one is often suitable as a lubricant for the other, without a hybrid ideological figure of its own design necessarily having to emerge.
In summary, a differentiated picture of "Left-Wing Conservatism" can be drawn. Depending on the constellation, conservative thinking—i.e., thinking aimed at preservation—can certainly co-harmonize with left-wing positions, though less in the form of a synthesis than in that of an incorporation. By harnessing conservative values, structures, and goals, left-wing projects can often be realized with less friction than through ostentatious demarcation, [34] but this "being incorporated" does not elevate the conservative to an equal counterpart. This is also evident in party and attitude research, which brought left-wing conservatism back into the political science spotlight in the first place; however, given the conceptual shortening of the term "conservatism," the findings there should be taken with the proverbial grain of salt.
More interesting than the term itself, upon closer inspection, is the question of what its use is intended to achieve. A stigmatizing intention is by no means always present, and as a serious analytical category, it is too "weak-chested." Perhaps, one might suspect with a view to the BSW as the supposedly left-conservative "Exhibit A," it primarily reflects an affective lack of understanding that even in the 2020s one can still—or again?—be left-wing without having to focus on all sorts of niche concerns. Yes, perhaps in the end it is nothing other than the emergence of the economic fundamental impulse of the Left and the associated speechlessness from which the urge for such a term arises—which then presents itself to the conceptually inexperienced as the latest fashion from the wardrobe of ideologies. In the end, however: nothing new under the sun.
My commentary: I really wish my Sanctioned Suicide posts would sound like that. This is the scientifical level I ever dream of but never will reach. They say the texts are writen for a mass audience and in a language that is open for laymen. Though, I have the feeling the content and the language is more academic than most of the things you will read in the mainstream press.
I found this article really interesting. The idea that moderate conservatism can make progressive politics/social change more acceptable. And it is a real issue that trade unions lose more and more influence where I live. It probably has to do with the century as an age of individualization. If everyone looks out for themselves, everyone is looked after. I think there is a dire need for leftwing conservativism in the US. Maybe Slavoj ZIzek would see Bernie Sanders as such a figure. Less when it comes to economic policies. There is a need for massive change in the US. But someone who belives in morals and differentiates between right and wrong. Someone for whom the term truth still counts. Leftwing conservatism as incorporative framwork is very interesting. There are policies of MAGA that could be considered sort of leftwing. But it is fake. It is Trump's rhetoric. He promises that the prices for medication will go down. He promises to rebuild American industries. And he doesn't deliver on decreasing inflation. In fact people like Trump make Americans even more cynical about politicis. (similar to Obama.) And paradoxically they radicalize further. If all of them promise change, the same old is delivered people lose hope. So the trust in the system/democracy declines further. Trump is just an accelerator. Trump is like a very disruptive figure in politics. But the change he delivers will fuel extremism. There was a time where Zizek thought in a Hegelian/dialectical sense that the first Trump term could fuel a leftwing countermovement with someone like Sanders. In fact history could (have) played out like that. It seems to be more likely though that the destruction of the US system and the damage that is done will enable even more radical successors to succeed. We will never be certain whether we actually hit rock bottom. We are in Trump's second year and it could become even way worse.
I asked an AI chatbot whether I could be in legal trouble for posting this post on here. (because of copyright issues). And the answer was funny. If you are posting on SaSu copyright infringements should be your least worries. Instead my post could be interpreted as spam because in a forum where everyone is on the edge of suicide noone will care about a politicial thesis. I could be seen by the community as out of touch if I post this here. LMAO. This made me laugh bro. Noone would be interested about academic debates on here. I think that's not true.
I used a translator. I will add my thoughts at the end. If you are interested in reading the whole article here is the link. https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschrift...inkskonservatismus-als-inkorporationsgefuege/
It is on German. You will need a translator. Most of the texts published by the Bundeszentral für politische BIldung are for free.
Left-Wing Conservatism as an Incorporative Framework
Conservative thinking can harmonize with left-wing positions, though less in the form of a synthesis than in that of an incorporation. By harnessing conservative values, structures, and goals, left-wing projects can be realized with less friction.
That there has been a renewed interest in conservatism over the past few years has hardly escaped any observer: biographical works adorn shop windows just as much as those longing for a conservative renaissance or warning of a conservative radicalization. Inevitably, the term is frequently misused—a fate it shares with many high-profile "isms."
However, conservatism is particularly ill-equipped to defend itself against such abuse, as there is no standard for what should count as conservative and what should not. There is no conservative manifesto, no canon, not even a fixed worldview in the sense of shared political positions. While textbooks and academic literature frequently cite the Irish-British philosopher Edmund Burke as the father of conservative thought, Burke was not an original forge of ideology, unlike many liberals or socialists; his Reflections on the Revolution in France were not intended as a program of eternal validity. Rather, they constitute a philosophically saturated attack on the main figures of the French Revolution, whose project Burke saw heading toward an abyss. For all its striving for progress, he argued it had lost sight of the nature of man—his psychological constitution—and had degenerated into a carnival of political frivolity. What, indeed, was gained from all those "extravagant and presumptuous speculations which have taught your leaders to despise all their predecessors, and all their contemporaries, and even to despise themselves, until the moment in which they became truly despicable"? [1]
Burke owes his current status as a conservative forefather primarily to the fact that, although he had defended the "Glorious Revolution" against English absolutism and held considerable sympathy for the young American nation's struggle for independence, this specific critique of revolution was later interpreted as a general anti-revolutionary stance. [2] A conservative "innovation value" only emerges because the coarsening of this position opens a line of thought in political theory that focuses on stability rather than change; it no longer asks about the conditions for revolution and regicide, but rather about those for the preservation of the status quo, which has now been elevated to the desired state.
Defense of the Present
This "traditionalism becoming reflexive," as sociologist Karl Mannheim termed it, [3] remains reactive in its essence and should therefore be interpreted as a phenomenon of weakness. That which is safe does not need to be awakened from its political slumber. At the same time, this already reveals the limits of conservatism: unlike utopian thinking, it is bound to the present, and as this present gradually fades, it must take a form that remains intelligible from the perspective of the succeeding present. Consequently, the contemporary conservative can only grapple to a limited extent with the revolutions of the past as a defender of the present and the near-present; the contemporary revolutionary, however, can draw seamlessly from their heritage, demanding its completion, fulfillment, and often its exaggeration. [4]
This imbalance becomes even more conspicuous when reading other thinkers designated as classics of conservatism, such as Joseph de Maistre. One inevitably pauses when he mocks the lofty concept of popular sovereignty, stating it is astonishing how many sovereigns are destined to die without ever having reigned, [5] or claims that "nation" is an "extremely convenient" term because "one can make of it what one wishes." [6] Hardly any conservative of our day would object to these foundations of the modern constitutional state, whereas for de Maistre, they were still contaminated by the "un-spirit" of revolution. Nor would most contemporaries likely share the judgment that the feudal order, once it reached maturity, proved to be the "most perfect" thing "ever seen on earth." [7] To be sure, one finds all sorts of timeless insights in the Savoyard's writings, and his polemics against the pathos-drunk Jacobins appear almost modern in light of neo-Jacobin tendencies. But in the end, he sets himself up as a partisan of a world whose reality lies far outside our contemporary sensibility. The Marxist—one notes with some regret—can still claim a degree of supra-temporality because he believes he recognizes an explorable natural law in historical materialism; the conservative, by contrast, sees himself washed over by the tides of history without a true long-term goal, constantly forced to fight new (and different) battles of preservation. [8] Some have taken this Sisyphus-like struggle against the current of time as an occasion to fundamentally question the existence of conservative philosophy. They argue such a philosophy is a mere ex post construction and has little in common with the thought of Burke, who did not advocate for any specific form of property or religion, but solely for the protection of these values from their total dissolution. [9] After all, one is not a historic preservationist simply because one doesn't want to blow up the entire neighborhood.
Preserving the Proven
From these preliminary considerations, it becomes clear that all things conservative are based on an immediate contextual link. There is no singular principle like liberty or justice that reigns above all others, [10] whose contours remain largely stable and which therefore serves as a supra-temporal landmark. Instead, conservatism can perhaps best be described as an attitude that ascribes intrinsic value to the "proven" and understands preservation as a normative process. For by preserving what has proven itself, so the conservative promise goes, one helps society achieve a stable foundation and the individual gain "orientation rails" for their own life: supports whose true meaning often only becomes apparent at the moment of their loss. [11] In this sense, conservatism stands opposed to both regressive [12] and progressive movements aimed at changing the existing order, yet it remains more a mindset than a fully developed ideology. [13] And where it is ideology, it is one of practice, finding expression in the successful management of everyday life rather than in the construction of intricate theoretical frameworks. This also explains why, for the former Maoist and later Minister-President Winfried Kretschmann, "Sustainability is the new conservative," [14] while others place their vanishing point in a past that many contemporaries already regarded as a period of moral decay. [15]
I will skip the following parts. Mostly because of paranoid copyright fears. And there are many references to German politics.
Left and Conservative?
As for the "Left-Wing Conservatism" of the title, it is not a new invention of our time (in which the tying together of real or apparent opposites is considered bon ton), but a compound with some history. Already in his 1956 review of William Angus Sinclair's Socialism and the Individual, philosopher Herbert W. Schneider summarily declared the author and politician a "left-wing conservative," [19] because Sinclair believed the Conservative Party would soon prove to be the most socially progressive force. This was an error from which the disappointed Sinclair concluded he should defect to the Labour Party. Socialism and the Individual is as much political-theoretical exegesis as it is a personal letter of resignation.
In short, a certain vagueness has always been inherent to the term. Sometimes it appears as an external description, sometimes as a self-description; sometimes as a crude amalgam, and then again as a self-confident hybrid. In any case, however, it seeks to place "preservation" as a conservative essence within a left-wing frame of reference, which generally implies a greater degree of social equalization. This is an endeavor that, prima facie, seems by no means absurd: why, after all, should there not be people who maintain a conservative worldview—such as the loose connection of national pride, traditional role expectations, and a majoritarian lifestyle—and who are simultaneously declared supporters of the welfare state and a more forceful practice of redistribution? Firstly, in the realm of human sentiment, there is nothing that does not exist; and secondly, this constellation does not give rise to the contradictions that some believe they see in it. Indeed, one could even formulate the thesis that the local welfare state—by its origins a project of containment by the conservative Bismarck—is not only an effective instrument for cushioning social tensions [23] but has long since entered the traditional stock of the Federal Republic. Similarly, one might suspect that from a conservative perspective, little speaks against redistribution as long as it is based on the right considerations—namely, those that stabilize the social order. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, conservatives of the type described are rarely libertarians. Hardly any of them would have much sympathy for a "rump state," deregulated to the bone, where only the law of the larger coin decides.
In fact, the fit is so good that one might think (depending on what one projects onto the figure of the conservative) that there is a significant number of left-conservative voters: voters who, in the parlance of the GAL-TAN model, [24] are economically on the left but socially firmly on the TAN side (Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist), thus populating the lower-left quadrant of the corresponding matrix. However, researching this group is difficult if only because a small selection of socio-political variables cannot be representative of the overall arrangement of conservatism. Those who distinguish between conservative and progressive not based on the diversity of principles, but on whether one speaks for or against same-sex marriage and more democracy, [25] run the risk of being overtaken by reality [26]—and simultaneously ignore the fact that a conservative approach is also possible in fields like foreign policy. The question, for instance, of whether one remains loyal to the transatlantic alliance, loses oneself in the fantasy worlds of an emerging multipolarity, or even wants to take up the anti-imperialist struggle alongside the "wretched of the earth," is likely no less significant for many self-declared conservatives than the question of the correct degree of sexual-political permissivity.
Strategic Incorporation
Against this background, the left-conservative voter appears more as a byproduct of an immature operationalization practice than as a fixed statistical constant. However, if one focuses on the conservative concern for preservation instead of individual traditional or authoritarian positions, "left-conservative" can also describe a way of conducting politics in which the "Left" deliberately incorporates the "Conservative" into its own logic—or vice versa. The utility of such incorporations arises from the matter itself: just as most conservatives are interested in the pacification of social conflict, [27] most leftists first want to make the welfare state institutionally "weatherproof" before attempting projects of the "World Revolution" variety. Thus, some will draw from the left-wing toolbox and others from the conservative one without much hesitation. All that remains significant is which principle co-opts the other—which is, in the words of Gerhard Schröder's coalition dictum, [28] the conceptual "cook" and which is the instrumental "waiter." In both cases, however, one would do well not to lightly transfigure incorporation into fusion, but to understand it as a strategic moment: born from the insight that "Left" and "Conservative" may exhibit habitual differences but do not necessarily relate to each other like oil and water. Depending on the issue, one is often suitable as a lubricant for the other, without a hybrid ideological figure of its own design necessarily having to emerge.
In summary, a differentiated picture of "Left-Wing Conservatism" can be drawn. Depending on the constellation, conservative thinking—i.e., thinking aimed at preservation—can certainly co-harmonize with left-wing positions, though less in the form of a synthesis than in that of an incorporation. By harnessing conservative values, structures, and goals, left-wing projects can often be realized with less friction than through ostentatious demarcation, [34] but this "being incorporated" does not elevate the conservative to an equal counterpart. This is also evident in party and attitude research, which brought left-wing conservatism back into the political science spotlight in the first place; however, given the conceptual shortening of the term "conservatism," the findings there should be taken with the proverbial grain of salt.
More interesting than the term itself, upon closer inspection, is the question of what its use is intended to achieve. A stigmatizing intention is by no means always present, and as a serious analytical category, it is too "weak-chested." Perhaps, one might suspect with a view to the BSW as the supposedly left-conservative "Exhibit A," it primarily reflects an affective lack of understanding that even in the 2020s one can still—or again?—be left-wing without having to focus on all sorts of niche concerns. Yes, perhaps in the end it is nothing other than the emergence of the economic fundamental impulse of the Left and the associated speechlessness from which the urge for such a term arises—which then presents itself to the conceptually inexperienced as the latest fashion from the wardrobe of ideologies. In the end, however: nothing new under the sun.
My commentary: I really wish my Sanctioned Suicide posts would sound like that. This is the scientifical level I ever dream of but never will reach. They say the texts are writen for a mass audience and in a language that is open for laymen. Though, I have the feeling the content and the language is more academic than most of the things you will read in the mainstream press.
I found this article really interesting. The idea that moderate conservatism can make progressive politics/social change more acceptable. And it is a real issue that trade unions lose more and more influence where I live. It probably has to do with the century as an age of individualization. If everyone looks out for themselves, everyone is looked after. I think there is a dire need for leftwing conservativism in the US. Maybe Slavoj ZIzek would see Bernie Sanders as such a figure. Less when it comes to economic policies. There is a need for massive change in the US. But someone who belives in morals and differentiates between right and wrong. Someone for whom the term truth still counts. Leftwing conservatism as incorporative framwork is very interesting. There are policies of MAGA that could be considered sort of leftwing. But it is fake. It is Trump's rhetoric. He promises that the prices for medication will go down. He promises to rebuild American industries. And he doesn't deliver on decreasing inflation. In fact people like Trump make Americans even more cynical about politicis. (similar to Obama.) And paradoxically they radicalize further. If all of them promise change, the same old is delivered people lose hope. So the trust in the system/democracy declines further. Trump is just an accelerator. Trump is like a very disruptive figure in politics. But the change he delivers will fuel extremism. There was a time where Zizek thought in a Hegelian/dialectical sense that the first Trump term could fuel a leftwing countermovement with someone like Sanders. In fact history could (have) played out like that. It seems to be more likely though that the destruction of the US system and the damage that is done will enable even more radical successors to succeed. We will never be certain whether we actually hit rock bottom. We are in Trump's second year and it could become even way worse.
I asked an AI chatbot whether I could be in legal trouble for posting this post on here. (because of copyright issues). And the answer was funny. If you are posting on SaSu copyright infringements should be your least worries. Instead my post could be interpreted as spam because in a forum where everyone is on the edge of suicide noone will care about a politicial thesis. I could be seen by the community as out of touch if I post this here. LMAO. This made me laugh bro. Noone would be interested about academic debates on here. I think that's not true.
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