
Superdeterminist
Enlightened
- Apr 5, 2020
- 1,757
In his 2002 book A New Kind of Science, computer scientist Stephen Wolfram proposed the principle of "Computational Irreducibility" (CI). This is an alleged property of systems (e.g. the weather, or water molecules in water) achieved once they hit a certain threshold of complexity. If a system is computationally irreducible, it means that it's impossible to capture all of its future behaviour with a single equation or theory, and the only way to find out what it will do is to actually run the system and observe what happens.

Above is an example of a system (cellular automaton rule 30) displaying CI. The vertical axis = time (t=0 at top). There are several recurring motifs (Wolfram calls these pockets of reducibility - he claims science essentially is the study of the pockets of reducibility in our universe). Overall though, the structure as a whole displays no discernible pattern (it is irreducible).
Wolfram suspects that the human brain, being so complex, possesses CI. If true, this would mean that it's impossible to predict anyone's future thoughts or behaviour with any single theory, equation, or set of equations; brains will always produce unforeseen results. Wolfram seems to subtly try to make a case for free will using this argument (thought I think he would probably deny it):
And it is this, I believe, that is the ultimate origin of the apparent freedom of human will. For even though all the components of our brains presumably follow definite laws, I strongly suspect that their overall behavior corresponds to an irreducible computation whose outcome can never in effect be found by reasonable laws.
However, I think that CI brains would only be unpredictable, they would not be any more "free" than predictable/computationally reducible brains (what exactly can "free" even mean?). Brains may be unpredictable, but they're still fully determined by their constituent parts, all obeying physical laws.
Wolfram opines that a CI universe is "a good thing" because it means that we avoid the boredom of a world where everything could be predicted and people could calculate their exact futures. Personally I disagree, because CI is a barrier to knowledge (it reveals the limitations of science - theories and their predictions will never capture all behaviour), and I think that the less we know, the less able we are to solve problems, = more suffering, and that is a terrible thing. I would rather be bored than ignorant, and moreover, I see boredom as just another human problem with a potential solution. Yes it is nice to have pleasant surprises, but this would come at the cost of being unable to predict and prepare for misfortune, which in my opinion isn't worth it.
All of this is still unverified and highly theoretical of course. And, perhaps Wolfram is extending computer science into domains where it doesn't belong. But it seems scarily solid as a theory. If you ask me though, I hope it isn't true.
Wolfram opines that a CI universe is "a good thing" because it means that we avoid the boredom of a world where everything could be predicted and people could calculate their exact futures. Personally I disagree, because CI is a barrier to knowledge (it reveals the limitations of science - theories and their predictions will never capture all behaviour), and I think that the less we know, the less able we are to solve problems, = more suffering, and that is a terrible thing. I would rather be bored than ignorant, and moreover, I see boredom as just another human problem with a potential solution. Yes it is nice to have pleasant surprises, but this would come at the cost of being unable to predict and prepare for misfortune, which in my opinion isn't worth it.
All of this is still unverified and highly theoretical of course. And, perhaps Wolfram is extending computer science into domains where it doesn't belong. But it seems scarily solid as a theory. If you ask me though, I hope it isn't true.